The automatic teller machine (ATM) will be for the foreseeable future the dominant mode of access to cash for those living in industrialized societies. In this article we present the ATM as a political site where a multiplicity of relationships-primarily but not exclusively between the customer and the bank-become configured in ways that serve some interests and not others. The article draws on the work of Winner, Haraway, and Latour in discussing the ongoing translation of ATMs as it occurs in the United Kingdom, with further reference to South Africa and the United States. In order to make some of the politics of the ATM more visible, we illustrate the political struggles through four interconnected narratives: (a) the talking ATM, (b) the insecure ATM, (c) the charging ATM, and (d) the cashless ATM. In each of these descriptive accounts we attempt to show how the ATM becomes (or is) a cybernetic actor that is configured and reconfigured through a multiplicity of political translations resulting in a multiplicity of politically significant cybernetic ATM networks. Finally, we briefly discuss how these narratives interrelate to form the political site of the ATM.
of inserting money to get money dispensed, the customer inserted a "token" in the form of a hole-punched voucher, purchased by the customer from the bank during opening hours. The voucher was inserted in one drawer and the machine dispensed a £10.00 note in another drawer if a correct verification code was entered. The technological breakthrough that made the cash dispenser possible was the technology to match the code on the hole-punched voucher with the code entered by the customer. This rather cumbersome machine was followed by the introduction of the magnetic strip in 1969 and the first fully automatic ATM in 1971, by Docutel, called the "Total Teller." By 1978 the first networked ATM, called the TABS 500, was developed and implemented in a number of locations in the United States by Diebold. Once the ATM was connected to the mainframe computer-and subsequent networks-the number of possible transactions increased dramatically, as well as the demand for ATMs by customers.
By 2003 there were approximately 52,500 ATMs in the United Kingdom (UK) (one ATM for every 1135 persons), dispensing £140 billion in 2.4 billion transactions. This would equate to approximately 40 billion visits per year per capita with an average withdrawal of £60.00 per transaction. In spite of multiple alternative modes of access, the ATM remains the predominant mode of access to cash. Other modes include withdrawals at a post office counter and a supermarket teller (referred to as a "cash back"). In the UK the Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS) predicts that in 2012, 75% of all access to cash will be through ATMs, as opposed to 51% in 2002 and 27% in 1992 (APACS, 2003 . The importance of ATMs becomes even more clear when one considers the fact that in 2003, 63% of personal (as opposed to business) payments in the UK were in the form of cash, in spite of the multiplicity of alternative payment methods available. It seems obvious from the preceding that the ATM is an important, one could almost say ubiquitous, technologyand it will remain so for the foreseeable future. Given the pervasiveness of this technology, it is surprising that it has not yet received any significant attention in the academic literature, especially from social study of technology (STS, as it is more commonly known) researchers. The existing literature on ATMs boils down to a number of ergonomic studies and a few studies on ATM users (Adams & Thiehen, 1991; Gill, 1996; Hatta & Iiyama, 1991; Johnson & Coventry, 2001; Rogers et al., 1997; Thatcher et al., 2005; Van der Heiden, 1990) . These studies tend to focus on the features (or attributes) of the technology and how different users interact, or might interact, with them. This type of research is obviously important. Nevertheless, in these studies the ATM is mostly conceived of as a product of technical design decisions (based on technical rationality) that serve particular, seemingly obvious, human needs. The assumed neutrality of technical rationality-and the resulting technical artifacts-as well as the often conflicting diversity of human needs that might be served (or not) are most often not problematized. Moreover, these studies often consider the localized human/machine relation in isolation from the wider network of sociotechnical relations in which it will eventually function. Our analysis here shows that it is only when these apparently innocent human/machine interactions are situated in the wider network of sociotechnical relations that ostensibly local "neutral technical features" translate into important political opportunities or consequences for some (and not for others).
Thus, at one level of analysis it is true that the ATM is a relatively simple device that enables bank customers to access their accounts, conduct certain transactions, and withdraw cash at their convenience. However, such an account "hides" more than it reveals. In our analysis we offer an entirely different account-or rather accounts-of the ATM as a political site. We show that the ATM is an important political actor embedded in a complex political landscape in which different actors have conflicting interpretations of what an ATM is-or is supposed to be-and where these actors are positioned asymmetrically in their ability to secure their implicit or explicit interpretations and interests. We believe such an account might create the possibility for us to "maintain the reversibility of foldings" of technology-which is our moral responsibility according to Latour (2002) . This moral imperative becomes very important in contexts where the politics of the ATM is not simply a matter of a bit of inconvenience. For example, in South Africa, as is the case in many developing countries, many individuals are unable to access the ATM network at all due to total or functional illiteracy (in 18% to 34% of the population) or due to the overwhelming physical distance (more than 20 km) that they have to travel to get to their nearest ATM (Statistics South Africa, 2001) . In cases such as these, the possibility of being enrolled in the financial sector at all, with attendant economic and social benefits, may be completely excluded. The importance of the ATM network and the way it functions are concomitantly extremely significant. It seems, therefore, entirely timely and justified to open this "black box" for scrutiny, to ask about the politics of the ATM as it emerges in different sociotechnical networks.
The objective of this article is to make some of the politics of the ATM more visible. It is just a rough sketch and in need of much more detail. Nevertheless, we hope that it is sufficient to convince STS researchers and policymakers of the importance of this ubiquitous political site. The article is structured as follows. First, we provide a brief outline of the theoretical work on the politics of technology that we implicitly and explicitly draw upon. Second, we illustrate the political struggles through four interconnected narratives of the ATM political site: (a) the talking ATM, (b) the insecure ATM, (c) the charging ATM, and (d) the cashless ATM. In each of these descriptive accounts we show how the ATM becomes (or is) a site that is configured and reconfigured through a multiplicity of political translations resulting in a multiplicity of politically significant cybernetic ATM networks. Finally, we discuss how these narratives interrelate to form the political site of the ATM. (1986, 1999) has argued that artefacts have politics. By this he meant that technology, by its very design, includes certain interests and excludes others, or more generally the fact that "specific features in the design or arrangement of a device or system could provide a convenient means of establishing patterns of power and authority in a given setting" (Winner, 1986, p. 36) . The politics of artifacts are mostly an implicit politics rather than an explicit politics. It is mostly not that designers decide (or decide not) to be political. Rather, politics is an implicit part of the mundane process of trying to solve practical problems in a world full of technological, financial, and other constraints. Winner (1999) summarizes his view well when he claims:
THE POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY: ARTIFACTS, CYBORGS, AND NETWORKS

Winner
The things we call "technologies" are ways of building order in our world. Many technical devices and systems important in everyday life [such as ATMs in our case] contain possibilities for many different ways of ordering human activity. Consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvertently, societies choose structures for technologies that influence how people are going to work, communicate, travel, consume, and so forth over a very long time. In the processes by which structuring decisions are made, different people are situated differently and possess unequal degrees of power as well as unequal levels of awareness. (p. 32) Not everybody agrees with Winner's analysis. Strong social constructivists such as Grint and Woolgar (1995) argue that "The politics and values of technology result from the gaze of the human; they do not lie in the gauze of the machine. . . . What the thing is, even what its exact capabilities and effects are, is not something that any kind of detached, objective, or realist analysis seems capable of constructing. What it is depends on who is describing it, although not every account of it is equal" (p. 306). The debate about "where" the politics and values "are," that is, in the technology or in the users, is a longstanding debate in social studies of technology-see, for example Kling (1992) , Brey (1997), and Radder (1992) . In this regard our view is located in the "constructivist" 1 tradition of Latour (1991) and Haraway (1991) . They suggest that the attempts to locate politics in the "social" or the "technical" are not relevant because the social and the technical are a unity from the start-they have never been otherwise.
For Latour, any talk of humans and nonhumans in ways that would suggest that they are separately already what they are-as "social" and "technical"-and then we "add" them together to "make" a socio-technical world is simply wrong. Latour (2003) suggests that both humans and nonhumans share a common constitutive history: "Humans and non-humans are engaged in a history that should render their separation impossible" (p. 39). More than that, they do not merely share a common history; they are each other's common history: "A body corporate is what we and our artefacts have become. We are an object institution" (Latour, 1999, p. 192, emphasis added) . In this "object institution"-that has never been otherwise-it may not be possible simply to allocate intentionality and properties this way or that way: "Purposeful action and intentionality may not be properties of objects, but they are also not properties of humans either. They are properties of institutions [collectives of humans and nonhumans], apparatuses, or what Foucault called dispositifs" (Latour, 1999, p. 192) . It is clear from these comments that Latour is talking about the human/nonhuman relationship as a fundamental co-constitutive unity in ways very similar to Heidegger (1962) . One of the important consequences of Latour's and Heidegger's position is that our encounter with technology is always conditioned from the very beginning, and in some fundamental way, by the horizon of intelligibility within we already find ourselves-it is already in some strict sense pregiven. In other words, in our everyday world of ongoing activity our encounter with technology is not unprecedented in such a way that we need to continuously interpret and make sense of it afresh in some idiosyncratic way. Rather, we tend to take up objects in the way they already show themselves in the world in which they are encountered as this or that particular thing. Although we can always in principle reinterpret the things we encounter, we tend not to do so. As we become familiar with technological possibilities (and the world in which they appear more generally) they become transparently available to us, so we simply use them in the way they show up as possibilities for this or that intention. For example, even if a pen can potentially be used as a weapon, we normally tend to take it simply as a possibility for writing when encountering it in our everyday flow of living. In this co-constitutive relationship of giving (of possibilities) and taking (of opportunities)-as Latour reminded usthe "intentionality [at work in this relationship] may not be properties of objects, but they are also not properties of [the] humans either" (Latour, 1991, p. 192) .
For Haraway (1991) , as for Latour, the social and the technical are a unity from the start-more precisely a cyborg. According to Haraway (1991) , the cyborg is "a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism . . . it is about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political work" (p. 150). In this view, the ATM is only what it is as "an ATM" when we conceive it as a cyborg. When we encounter it, the human/machine cyborg becomes alive through the ongoing-and mutually constitutive-interplay of the human/machine interactivities: the inserting of a card (human), asking for PIN number (machine), pushing of keys (human), giving options (machine), following of a sequence of steps (human), and so forth. Once we remove the assumed boundary (and see the ATM as an ongoing human/machine hybrid or chimera) it becomes more evident that certain scripts (or sequences of activities) are possible and others not. In each of the steps the human mostly draws on pregiven default assumptions (and interpretations) about the machine and likewise the machine about the human. But it is not "us" (humans) against "them" (machines). It is rather a simultaneous event of control (scripts) and possibilities (access). From the cyborg perspective we see these two perspectives simultaneously, according to Haraway (1991) : "From one perspective, a cyborg world is about the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet, from another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines. . . . The political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point" (p. 154, emphasis added). In drawing on Haraway's notion of the cyborg . (Harraway, 1991) and on Latour's notion of an "object institution" (Latour, 1999) we want to show how the ATM actor network problematizes and destabilizes the assumed boundary between the social (values and needs) and the technical (technical facts). This is essential if one is to understand the politics of a technology.
It is not only the boundary between the social and the technical that must be problematize it is also the assumed boundary between the local (the node) and the global (the network) that needs to be questioned. We might say that the cyborg is never what it is on its own. Rather, these cyborgs function as nodes, or links, in a dynamic cybernetic network (or actor network) kept in place by a multiplicity of artifacts, agreements, alliances, conventions, translations, procedures, threats, and so forth: in short, by relationships of power and discipline (Callon, 1986) . Some are stable, even irreversible; some are dynamic and fragile. Analytically we can isolate and describe these networks as we do for the ATM (see also Law, 1991 , for further examples). However, as we survey the landscape of networks we cannot locate, in any obvious manner, where they begin nor where they end. Indeed, we cannot with any degree of certainty separate the purely social from the purely technical, cause from effect, designer from user, winners from losers, and so on. In these complex and dynamic cybernetic networks, ATMs, users, banks, criminals, headphones, cameras, algorithms, and so forth function as cyborgian institutions-"locations" in and through which values and interests are negotiated and ultimately "inscribed" into the very materiality of the cyborg institutions themselves, thereby rendering these values and interests more or less permanent (Akrich, 1992; Introna & Nissenbaum, 2000; Introna & Wood, 2004; Callon, 1986 Callon, , 1991 Latour, 1991; Law, 1991) .
It is our claim that one of the important cybernetic networks that order our world is the ATM-as we indicated earlier. For example, we claim that the designers of the ATM cybernetic network configured the user/ATM for the average enabled person, thereby neglecting a significant, already marginalized, community of (dis)abled people. We want to show that it is often the majority and the powerful who attempt to build these networks to serve their own interests (able-bodied designers, banks, criminals, etc.)-not that they are always successful. Often their intentions become dispersed and distributed through the network in ways that may result in many undesired consequences, as we will show. Nevertheless, we would claim that it is possible to conceive of the ATM cybernetic network in different (less disabling or exclusive) ways, which could order the activity of gaining access to cash and the bank in a multiplicity of different ways-that is, it could be otherwise. That is, the cyborg that is the user/ATM/bank can be configured in a multiplicity of ways, each of which has different political implications. However, each of these configurations is at any time neither innocent nor neutral.
When we say "political" in this context we mean "serving particular interests" and not others, and that these interests are, given the nature and purpose of the ATM, often economic interests. With Foucault (1984) and Haraway (1991) , we also want to be reminded that this politics of the ATM is not essentially repressive or restrictive; it is indeed mostly enabling and productive-allowing simultaneously for both "dominations" and "possibilities" in Haraway's terms.The question-which is an empirical question-is, "for whom and in what ways?" Although the politics of the ATM cannot be avoided, it can and ought to be scrutinized. It is not that the interests of those already served by the network are necessarily illegitimate. However, leaving them unscrutinized may be dangerous-that is, there is "political work" that needs doing. It is evident that the current configuration of the ATM cyborg can bring about many positive consequences for those included in the ATM cyborg (access to cash during 24 hours, convenient locations, multiple transaction possibilities, global access to funds, etc.). Nevertheless, it is those excluded from the network and the less powerful that are first and foremost our concern here.
THE POLITICAL MULTIPLICITY OF THE ATM CYBORG
Some Methodological Comments
In order to make the politics of ATMs visible, we wanted to describe different situated and particular narratives or political programs that emerged from our primary and secondary data. In the first stage of the research we collected secondary data on ATM usage from government reports, media articles, interest groups, advocacy organizations, and academic literature. These data were then organized using a cognitive (mind) mapping software application called Mindraw. Initially, the data was organised using recurring keywords and themes. These where then categorized and summarized into the larger themes that became our different narratives-the narratives of the talking, insecure, and charging ATMs. The building of the cognitive maps allowed the political issues as expressed by the different stakeholders to emerge from the data. Most certainly the analysis is not complete. Obviously, it might be possible to identify other narratives or to categorise the data differently. Nevertheless we would suggest that our data and analysis does demonstrate our central claim, namely, that the ATM is not merely a neutral technology for the "convenient access to cash" but that it is rather an important political site that is in need of a more sustained level of critical scrutiny.
Intuitively and from our data it was clear that physical access to ATMs is an important issue, especially in developing countries. However, initially, we did not have much data to develop a coherent discussion around this theme. In the course of our research it came to our attention that access issues were being explicitly addressed by First National Bank (FNB) in South Africa. FNB configured a Mini ATM cyborg. This system is being deployed in many areas that were denied access to the more traditional form of ATM. In May 2005 one of the researchers conducted a number of interviews with a senior member of the bank responsible for the system, Michael Arnold, and conducted site visits in Soweto, Orange Farm, and Evaton, all south of Johannesburg. These site visits included interviews with the salesperson responsible for the units, with the owners or managers of the stores where the units are deployed, and with some of the customers. It also involved the observation of some actual Mini ATM transactions. The data gathered from these visits were also thematically coded, and the results were integrated into the existing cognitive map. A fourth narrative, that of the cashless ATM, a specific instance of which is the Mini ATM, was identified.
The final organization of the data (in the cognitive map) thus included both primary and secondary data from two very different financial markets (and sociocultural contexts), that of the UK, which is a developed country, and that of South Africa, a developing country. 2 Our intention in using these very different examples is not necessarily to compare the usage of the ATM across these different contexts-although the reader will see some comparative differences as well as points of similarity in the data presented. For example, the advice to ATM users on security matters is markedly similar across the two countries, and the profile of the user who will make more frequent ATM withdrawals, and therefore be more seriously disadvantaged by the charging ATM, seems to be quite similar across the UK, South Africa, and even the United States. At the same time, we are by no means suggesting any sort of universality for the claims we are making about the ATM cyborg as such. Rather, we explicitly claim that the cybernetic network, the cyborg, extends beyond the technology, to the user, and therefore the usage of the ATM in any particular situation is precisely that, particular to the situation-that is, the politics of the ATM matters in the specifics of every case. We have included the material from both the UK and South Africa (and on occasion from the United States) because it is illustrative of particular situations, and particular contexts, and as such it shows up instances in which the in-/ exclusionary nature of the ATM network comes to the fore. There are undoubtedly other examples from other countries that would do the same, just as there are other narratives.
The discussion that follows is structured into each of the four narratives, each of which then includes the use of both the secondary and primary data. Where primary data is used this is indicated in the text.
The Talking ATM: Toward "Universal Access"
When approaching and interacting with a standard textbased ATM it soon becomes obvious that it makes a whole range of assumptions about the person in front of it. It assumes that the user is able to approach it, see the screen, read the content of the screen, insert the banking card, press the buttons (or screen) required for input, hear the input verification signal (beep), remember a personal identification number (PIN), follow the instructions on the screen, remove the card, cash, or receipt, verify that the correct amount of cash was dispensed, and so forth.
In each of these cases it is possible to list a number of reasons why the assumption will not hold up for a number of disabled individuals-or rather, why the assumptions of the designers may disable certain potential users. One might respond by arguing that these cases constitute a rather small percentage of the population. However, research by Van der Heiden (1990) shows that between 15% and 20% of the population has a disability that would make it difficult or impossible for them to use a standard ATM. In South Africa, 34% of adults are functionally illiterate and therefore potentially disabled in using the text-based ATM. In all of these instances, it would be more accurate to say that a not-insubstantial number of people are disabled by the standard ATM because the ATM makes inappropriate assumptions about them. How can those who are disabled and therefore excluded get their interests inscribed into the ATM cyborg? We will use the talking ATM as a typical case and general spokesperson for all those that are disabled by the standard text-based ATM. Through the example of the talking ATM we want to highlight and emphasize the many different, equally important, ways in which users are disabled by the standard ATM. We describe how the talking ATM got its voice, how it "talks," and how the user "listens."
One of the most common exclusions in the standard ATM design is the interests of blind or poorly sighted individuals. Deborah Kendrick (2001) , a blind person, explains what it is like to be confronted with a standard silent ATM:
It was a Sunday afternoon in 1995 when I desperately needed cash for an upcoming event and was nowhere near the single automated teller machine (ATM) whose keypad and sequences I had memorized. My daughter was six years old and a gifted reader. "You'll have to read the screen to me," I told her, on our walk to the ATM whose location I had learned from a few inquiries to people in the area. But the ATM was higher than a six-year-old's eye level, and I had to lift her up after each step of the simple transaction was executed. More than once, our responses were too slow, and that machine made that unmistakable error sound, repetitious beeping, as it spit my card back out of the slot bearing the braille label "Insert card." Eventually, the transaction was completed, but along with the cash in my hand, I walked away with no small amount of aggravation. (online) Note that in the silent ATM cyborg the nonhuman expects the blind human to know it intimately by memorizing its scripts-its location, its layout, the keypad and the sequence of the transaction-otherwise he or she will be disabled. The way to enable these individuals is to reconfigure the ATM, to make the machines talk: the transformation (or rather translation) from a silent ATM to a "talking ATM."
The first talking ATM in the United States was installed by a credit union in San Francisco City Hall in 1999-32 years after the first cash dispenser came into use in Barclays Bank, UK. The talking ATM was mostly the result of three political developments: (a) the 1990 Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) with its associated ATM guidance in 1992-which required banks to make ATMs "accessible to and independently usable by persons with vision impairments"; (b) an ongoing advocacy by activists especially on the basis of the ADA law, which resulted in settlement agreements with a number of banks; and (c) the development of reasonably inexpensive text-to-speech technology. In the UK similar legislation was implemented with the passing of the Disability Discrimination Act in 1995. However, there is still a very limited availability of talking ATMs in the UK.
The difference between the standard ATM machine and the talking ATM machine is not very obvious at first glance. The only external difference is the rather inconspicuous earphone jack. However, the talking ATM cyborg is a completely different cyborg for the blind or poorly sighted person. Kendrick (2001) explains her first experience of being enabled, of being recognized and being spoken to:
In March 2001, while attending the CSUN "Technology and Persons with Disabilities" conference in Los Angeles, I took a cab to a nearby Bank of America after banking hours to have my first look at a talking ATM. Equipped with only my own ATM card and a common earphone, I approached the machine. Locating the universal earphone jack, I plugged in and immediately heard a welcome message. The human voice gave me a quick orientation to the braille-labeled keypad and instructed me to find the braille-labeled point for inserting my card. Throughout the transaction, I was prompted by the human voice scripts to select withdrawal from checking or savings, was informed where the desired keys were located, and heard my transaction confirmed each step of the way. On completion, the voice directed me to the spot on the machine where cash could be removed and I could collect my receipt. . . . The particular machine I used apologized at transaction's end for not having account balances available verbally at this time. It also apologized for the $1.50 surcharge to my account, since I am not a Bank of America customer. . . . no apologies were needed! (online) In the talking ATM cyborg both the human and the nonhuman had to be reconfigured. The ATM has to have WAV sound files for all standard prompts, synthesized speech for variable information such as account balances, and braille labeling. The user must have a set of headphone available to hand. Thus we see how the political interests of the different actors become translated and inscribed into the ATM site, as indicated in Table 1 .
In our discussion so far of the talking ATM cyborg, we have not brought into the discussion the myriad actors that facilitated (or prevented) this translation from a silent ATM to a talking ATM. We could have included in our narrative details of the roles that the different interest groups played in shaping and reshaping the translation from the silent to the talking ATM cyborg, such as the technology suppliers Diebold and NCR, the National Foundation of the Blind, lawmakers, and so forth. Furthermore, in our discussion of this translation from the silent ATM to the talking ATM we have not made explicit the many other "outsiders" that are still excluded. For example, Gill (1996) relates some of the scripts required by the silent ATM to become more inclusive for others on the outside, such as wheelchair users, those who cannot walk without aid, those who have limited or no use of an arm, or fingers, the intellectually impaired, or people with dyslexia. He also indicates that in some cases there are simple "technical" translations available for these outsiders to become integrated in the ATM cyborg. Even his suggestions only cover a small sample of the excluded. Others include, for example, those who find the standard silent ATM-so obvious to many-difficult to comprehend. In their study, Hatta and Iiyama (1991) showed that in a group of people aged between 20 and 68-who are nonusers or who use an ATM only once or twice a month-32% failed when trying to make a deposit, 42% failed when trying to make a withdrawal, and 47% failed when trying to complete a transfer on their first attempt. By their third try most succeeded in making a deposit, but 8% still could not make a withdrawal or transfer funds. In another study involving individuals over the age of 50 who had never used an ATM before, Adams and Thieben (1991) found that even after 20 minutes of training only 40% of the group could use the ATM successfully on every attempt. These studies show clearly how many assumptions about the user "in front of it" are embedded, to varying degrees, in the materiality of the ATM cyborg. It is only when they are invalid-when there is a breakdown-that they become visible.
Through the narrative of the translation from the silent ATM to the talking ATM we wanted to make visible the way in which a significant group of people (the minority) is disabled by the silent ATM (of the majority). Through this example we also illustrated how those on the outside can become included by having their interests inscribed into the talking ATM cyborg. Obviously, the talking ATM will include some of the excluded minority but certainly not all. There are still many outsiders that remain outside for many different reasons. We can only imagine what sort of ATM cyborg might emerge if we take seriously the political issue of including all the excluded into the cyborg-that is, providing universal access. We now want to turn to a different set of actors and show how their interests are negotiated (or not) through the (in)secure ATM.
The Insecure ATM: Toward a Safe Transaction
The ATM is a place where one of the most important universal value items can be accessed-namely, hard cash. It is therefore not surprising that it is a place where criminals see an opportunity to have their interests inscribed. It was reported that in the UK ATM crime increased by 85% in 2004, resulting in £61 million being stolen from ATM customers (Jones, 2004) Across Europe there has been a similar increase resulting in losses of 49 million in 2004. Moving the cash dispensing transaction from the banking hall to the "hole in the wall" outside the bank has also moved the problem of security from inside the bank (where it is predominantly the bank's problem) to outside the bank (where it is predominantly the customer's problem). Differently put, safety is trans-acted from the bank to the customer. How do criminals try to inscribe their inter- ests into the ATM network? We consider two of the many ways being used: card trapping, and card skimming. A card trap 3 is a plastic sleeve that is fed into the ATM slot before a customer approaches to insert a card. The sleeve traps the card and prevents the machine from detecting that a card has been inserted. The criminal normally stands behind the customer and offers help, often in the form of: "This also happened to me last week, I just typed my PIN in twice and it returned my card." The unsuspecting customer types the number in, with the "helpful" person watching close by. After attempting to do this, but finding the card is not returned, the customer gives up, thinking that the machine has "swallowed" the card and that the person will need to report it to get it returned. When the unsuspecting customer leaves, the criminal removes the "loop" device along with the card. Knowing the customer's PIN number, the fraudster then withdraws the maximum daily cash limit.
Card skimming is a more sophisticated translation. A magnetic card reader-called a "skimming" device-is attached to the ATM card slot in such a way that the user sees it as an inherent part of the ATM. When the user enters their card it goes through the skim reader before entering into the ATM card slot. The skimming device reads the card details and transmits it to a nearby receiver. A remote miniature camera is mounted in an inconspicuous location to capture the PIN code as it is entered. Since the transaction proceeds normally, the user will not be aware that the data is being stolen. The card is cloned using the details from the magnetic strip. The cloned card and PIN are then used to gain access to the victims account (Bruce, 2003) . The availability of low-cost standardized wireless cameras and card readers has made this type of crime relatively simple to execute even with limited technical expertise.
In both of these cases the ATM cyborg is translated from a secure ATM to an insecure ATM by a temporary reconfiguration or translation-this becomes possible by subverting the scripts of the secure ATM. Of course, this translation is not always successful. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the translation will only be successful if the human part of the cyborg conforms to the new script being used. We can represent this translation in Table 2 .
There have been many attempts to prevent this translation from happening. Obviously, it is vitally important for the bank that customers trust the ATM. Without the ATM the customers would need to be serviced inside the bank hall, which is very costly. For example, the cost of an ATM transaction is less than a third that of a transaction with a human teller inside the bank (Select Committee on Treasury, 2005) . Even without these translations, safety is one of the major reasons older people give for not using ATMs. Rogers, Gilbert, and Cabrera (1997) found that 34% of older adults (aged between 61 to 81 years) indicated that they do not use the ATM because they do not feel safe in doing so. This was the second highest reason they gave for not using the ATM.
How can the insecure ATM be translated back to a secure ATM? Securing the ATM requires changes in the cybernetic network as a whole (humans and nonhumans alike). Let us consider some of these. One simple device to secure the ATM cyborg is to inscribe a "no-go" space in front of the ATM to demarcate the zone of privacy that users require to operate the ATM. In a Home Office trial such a zone-a 1-meter-square box-was painted in front of the ATM in bright white or yellow lines, sometimes with the words "ATM zone" on the inside (White, 2004) . CCTV footage revealed that most people respected the boxes by queuing outside it until it was their turn to use the machine. It was claimed that "the scheme left users feeling safer-checking before and after using their accounts that no one else was in the box and leaving them more able to challenge suspects" (White, 2004) . Such mechanisms are not foolproof, since fraud techniques such as "shoulder surfing" (where a criminal observes the PIN code over the shoulder of the user) are still being used in environments that have had demarcation zones for some time, as is the case in South Africa. This fraud is facilitated by users, who when they experience difficulties-real and staged-with the ATM, invite someone else into the demarcation zone. Either way, the action or enrollment of the user are critical to the success of the technical inscription.
A more sophisticated technical inscription is needed to prevent the attachment of skimming devices. For example, the ATM technology supplier Wincor Nixdorf has developed an anti-skimming module, installed in the ATM, which uses special sensors to check the entire card slot area for any devices which may have been attached to it. If the sensors detect any suspicious device the machine shuts down immediately. Other manufacturers have developed, for example, technology that rejects "cloned" cards or detects if any object is inserted into the card slot that is not a legitimate card, and so forth.
To secure the ATM, humans must also be enrolled. Here is a selection-taken from a number of online sources 4 -of the typical advice given to customers by banks and law enforcement agencies (in the UK and South Africa) on how they ought to behave in front of an ATM: r Minimize time spent at the ATM by having your card out and ready to use when approaching the machine.
r Do not use the ATM if you see anything suspicious such as duct tape on the sides, a hand-lettered sign, alternative card slot, or requests to put the card in a different slot.
r Memorize your PIN. Never write it down or give it to anyone, not even your spouse or a bank employee.
r Do not trust anyone who offers to help you at an ATM.
r Know where the security cameras are located.
While many ATMs have cameras, they won't be positioned to record the keypad. r Never count cash at the machine or in public. Wait until you are home, in your car, or at another secure location. r Set a daily withdrawal limit that suits your needs. The larger your daily withdrawal limit, the larger your potential loss.
r Only use ATMs in safe, well-lit areas. r If you need assistance with an ATM transaction, ask a bank employee for help, and not a security guard posted at an ATM.
r Stand close to the ATM and shield the keypad with one hand when entering your PIN. Try using the knuckle of your middle finger to key in the PIN.
Most certainly this is all good advice. Nevertheless, imagine the sort of mind set one would need to enter into if one would heed this advice every time one approached an ATM. We must also be careful to note how the user becomes enrolled into the task of securing the ATM site as such. In withdrawing cash from the ATM the user is not only saving the bank money, by not using a human teller, the user is also enrolled into taking on the responsibility for securing the ATM more generally. The user is in effect being enrolled as a temporary "guard" who is expected to report "anything that seems suspicious or strange about the ATM" to the bank. In some cases it is not only the ATM user who is enrolled but also others that may compromise the ATM site. For example, many states in the United States have laws against panhandling (begging) within a certain distance from an ATM. It typically varies from 8 feet to 20 feet. Thus, one can imagine another box on the ground around the ATM, larger than the previous one, where "undesirables" are excluded. This "invisible" boxconstituted through the laws on begging-is as much part of the ATM cybernetic network as the machine in the wall. It functions to inscribe certain scripted behaviors into the ATM cyborg to realize the interest of the majority.
Some people believe that a technological solution to ATM security is the use of biometrics to control access (fingerprint, handprint, iris scan, etc.). Biometric-based ATMs are already being implemented in Columbia (using fingerprint) and Japan (using palm vein print), and being trialed in a number of other countries. With biometrics, access to the ATM is via the body of the user (finger, hand, eye, etc.). From the bank's point of view, this will ensure that the ATM transaction is financially secure, namely, that they bank can be sure that it was the authorized person who did the transaction since "you are your body and your body never lies." However, what will the implications be for the security of the body? Will biometric ATMs not merely shift the problem of security from the security of the transaction to the security of the body? Might it be that in successive translations security has progressively become translated in ways that serve the banks' interests but not necessarily the users' interests-from the banking hall (banks problem) to the ATM site (bank and user's problem) to the body (user's problem)? What we observe is the externalization of the security problem by the bank and the internalization of the security problem by the user-inscribed in their flesh, as it were. In the next narrative we want to discuss a political issue that is much more pervasive, that affects most of us-that of being charged or not. Moreover, we want to show through this narrative how different actors seize opportunities to reinterpret the ATM site to serve their interests.
The Charging ATM: Toward a "Market" for Access
One of the important reasons for an ATM is to make cash available to the customers of the bank. This is an essential part of operating a current account on behalf of the customer. Without the "automatic teller machine" a customer would need to do an "over-the-counter" transaction involving a human teller, costing the bank approximately £1.10 per transaction (Cruickshank, 2000) . This is significantly more than an ATM transaction, which costs the bank approximately £0.35 per transaction (Cruickshank, 2000) . Thus, one could argue that for every transaction the customer does at the ATM, the bank in effect saves £ 0.75. It is therefore in the interest of the bank that customers use ATMs. In addition, if the bank then charges a customer for using the bank's ATM it would imply that the bank would save money (by having less human tellers) and also make money by generating income from the ATM charges-all other things being equal. We note an important translation that occurs. The initial rationale for the ATM was increased convenience, not increased efficiency as such. The initial ATMs cost much more than a human teller (Allison, 1995) . Clearly banks believed that their customers would find this increased access to their cash significant, as the 1969 Chemical Bank's advertising campaign, launching its ATMs, announced: "On Sept. 2, our bank will open at 9:00 and never close again!"
As network technology developed it became possible for customers to use the ATMs of other banks as well as those of their own bank. In the UK this was facilitated through the LINK network. LINK Interchange Network Ltd is the company that operates the ATM network on behalf of its members (banks and independent ATM deployers). This integration into a common network was obviously in the interest of banks as it migrated even more customers out of the banking hall, where transactions were expensive, to the hole in the wall. It was also in the interest of the customers as it was easier to gain access to their money-that is, if you were not already excluded from the ATM because you did not meet its assumptions about you, as we discussed earlier. In the LINK network the number of ATMs available exploded. How did the banks deal with customers from other banks using their ATMs?
LINK acted as a clearing agency that calculated an interchange fee, which was charged by the owner of the ATM to the customer's bank for the transaction. For example, if a customer of Bank A uses a cash machine owned by Bank B to make a cash withdrawal, then Bank A will pay Bank B an "interchange fee" for this service. If Bank B and Bank A's customers use each other's ATMs at more or less the same level, then the interchange fee earned would be equal to the interchange fee paid, and thereby none of the banks would incur an extra cost for increasing the number of ATMs available to their customers. Indeed, it may save the banks costs as they may be able to reduce the availability of human tellers in banking halls, and close branches, as has been happening in the UK since the early 1990s.
The introduction of the interchange fee starts the translation from service to a market for access. If a particular bank can attract more "foreign" transactions and keep its own customers "loyal," then it can reduce the total cost to them of providing the ATM facility since the cost per transaction for a particular ATM decreases as the number of transactions increases at that ATM. Thus it is in the interest of the bank to attract as many transactions as possible, especially "foreign" transactions. This has led to a number of important political consequences; we mention only two here:
r First is the attempt by banks in the UK to introduce a "disloyalty" fee if a customer uses another bank's ATM. The actual fees charged were in fact more than the interchange fee, in some cases more than seven times the interchange fee (Treanor, 1999) . After intense pressure from customers, government, and regulatory authorities, the banks abandoned this approach in 2000/2001. r Second, banks are keener to locate their ATMs in places where they will attract the maximum number of transactions, or "footfall," as it is sometimes referred to. This meant that ATMs were increasingly located away from the branch at high-density points such as shopping malls. As branches were closed and ATMs moved to high-density locations (to compete for transactions), some areasmost notably poorer neighborhoods-had fewer and fewer branches and ATMs available to them.
We must carefully note the successive translations of the ATM cyborg. The configuration of the ATM cyborg shifted from a technology for convenience (serving the interest mostly of the customer), to a technology for saving costs (serving the interest of the customer and the bank), to a technology for making money (serving the interest mostly of the bank). Moreover, in these successive translations a new market was created-a market for access to cashwhich is now no longer assumed to be part of the service that a bank provides its customers. Thus, when we now approach an ATM we not approaching our bank; we are rather participating in this market for access to cash. In this context, "convenience" emerges again, but this time as a service to be bought in the market-hence the emergence of the charging ATM.
This reconfiguration of the ATM as a charging ATM opens the door for fee-charging independent ATM deployers (IAD) 5 -not associated with any particular bank-to compete for traffic in the "gaps" left by the banks that are increasingly moving to high-density areas. Where are these gaps? They tend to be in low-volume spots such as rural areas or less affluent areas-basically any area where transaction volumes do not "justify" a bank ATM. From the perspective of the IADs they argue that they are simply offering the consumers more choice: "deploying cash machines in many locations where there had previously not been a machine. These deployments are driven by consumer demand and simply offer consumers an additional convenient choice of access to cash" (Select Committee on Treasury, 2005, online) . This seems a reasonable argument. 6 However, in many of these areas access to an ATM is not a matter of increased convenience. Often the IAD ATM, which charges the user directly for the transaction, is the only ATM available in some areas. At present there are no regulations in the UK to force banks to cover rural areas (in the way that the postal service is forced to cover uneconomic rural areas). From 2000 onward we see a steady increase in nonbranch ATMs and charging IAD ATMs, as indicated in Figure 1 For the IADs, the "gaps" in the market also need to be made as much as they need to be found. In this context a new actor emerges in the network, the site owner. As banks move away from branch locations they need to enrol the site owners (fuel service stations, malls, pubs, shops, and so forth) to allow them to locate their ATM on, or in, their sites. However, when they get to the site they are increasingly likely to meet the IADs, equally keen to locate their ATMs on the site. In the competition for sites it is now a matter of the benefits the ATM owner can offer the site owner. In this market for location, the IADs often "offer the site owner financial inducements to replace free cash machines with charging ones" (Select Committee on Treasury, 2005) . This increases the cost of running the ATM, which may lead to a situation where it becomes too expensive for the bank to operate its free ATM even in the high-volume location: " Often only independent operators, who raise income from charging consumers for using their ATMs can economically justify paying . . . higher prices for prime sites" (Select Committee on Treasury, 2005).
It seems clear from the preceding discussion that it will become increasingly difficult for some individuals and communities to get access to a free ATM. Whose interests are inscribed in the charging ATM, and whose are excluded? Research by the National Consumer Council has shown that people on lower incomes prefer to manage their money on a daily basis (Cullum, 2005) . This means that they would tend to make frequent, small withdrawals rather than infrequent large ones. At a charging ATM, a single withdrawal costs £1.50 on average. This means that someone withdrawing £50 per week in five £10 withdrawals would pay more than £30 a month in ATM fees-this would equate to a cost of almost 10% for access. This is a translation that is not only true in the UK but also in America, as expressed by Peebles (2004, p. 72 ) in Harper's Magazine: "Access to cash is not a market-organized choice but is, for poorer Americans, at least, a daily necessity. The unequal burden of ATM fees represents a retreat-one of many, in recent decadesfrom the modern ideal of social equality." That access is undoubtedly a political issue is increasingly being recognized in countries such as South Africa, where a body of research and advocacy is emerging that challenges the cost and difficulties of access to financial services, particularly for poorer individuals (Du Preez & Clayton, 2004; Porteous, 2003 Porteous, , 2004 ) As a direct result, a basic banking account was launched in South Africa in October 2004 in an effort to provide affordable and accessible banking to currently "unbanked" individuals (The Banking Council South Africa, 2004). In the South African case, however, as in the American one, the default option is in fact the charging ATM, and only one withdrawal per month is free, even on the "basic" account. Thereafter an access charge of 10% becomes again probable, based on an average cost per withdrawal of R5 (about £0.50).
The charging ATM is the outcome of a complex political process in which a market for access to cash has emerged as the logical and often unintended outcome of many diverse attempts by different actors to inscribe their interests into the ATM cybernetic network, as shown in Table 3 .
In the next narrative we turn our attention to an issue particularly important for developing countries or those in rural areas where physical access to an ATM is an issue. The narrative is situated in the South African context.
The Cashless ATM: Toward More Universal Access
The three narratives that we have presented thus far have an underlying assumption that most adults have a bank account, and that most of these people need regular access to funds held in that account in some way. This is probably a reasonable assumption in the case of developed countries, but it is not in many developing countries. In South Africa, for example, around 50% of adults are "unbanked," or excluded (by choice or by force of circumstance) from the formal banking system in its entirety. This means that in South Africa "a large pool of funds circulates outside the formal financial system, including but not limited to funds held by 'stokvels' [savings clubs], informal traders
TABLE 3
Translation in the case of the free and charging ATMs
Cyborg
Before negotiation: The free ATM After negotiation: The charging ATM Nonhuman Standard ATM ATM with a charge Human A human expecting access to cash as part of the service of the bank.
A human who must "figure out" what ATM they are using, or who has no choice but to pay for access to his or her money.
and in other forms of short-term savings" (The Banking Council South Africa, 2004) . This is perhaps not entirely attributable to the exclusionary nature of the ATM as an interface, but rather to the more generally exclusionary nature of banking technology in its broadest sense, and even to a basic lack of funds to bank among the unemployed (FinMark Trust, 2005) . However, the South African financial sector itself has recognized the challenge of access to the ATM in the context of exclusion, and is targeting effective access for previously "unbanked" individuals in its 2003 Empowerment Charter. 7 In this context, effective access includes "being within 20kms [now 15] of the nearest service point. . . includ[ing] ATM and other origination points" (SA Treasury, 2003) . In other words, currently there are individuals in the "deeply rural" areas of the country who are completely excluded from the possibility of ATM use at all. The requirement to provide effective access has led First National Bank (FNB) to introduce a Mini ATM or cashless ATM. While it is inherent in the idea and origination of the ATM as a type of dispensing machine that it will dispense cash, in the case of the Mini ATM the machine dispenses-in a reversal of the original design-a voucher for cash instead. This voucher is then redeemed for cash by the site owner, while the full amount of the withdrawal is credited to the site owner's FNB bank account. Mini ATMs are sited in small local convenience stores or corner shops. As disclosed by FNB, "These portable devices can easily be installed and don't require the same infrastructure that is needed on a full service ATM, thereby making this an important element in FNB's strategy of reaching the previously unbanked in rural South Africa" (FNB, 2005c) . Thus the cost of both infrastructure and operation is reduced, making it feasible to deploy units in remote and lower volume areas. Technical feasibility is also addressed, as the units can be battery powered (in areas where there is no electricity) and can use GPRS, or General Packet Radio Service (in areas where there are no land lines) (FNB, 2005b) .
The actual ATM is, in size and appearance, more or less equivalent to a point-of-sale device (POS), as shown in Figure 2 . The Mini ATM device is placed on a perspex housing The key difference between the ATMs and POS devices, be they for credit or debit cards, is that the charging logic is that of the charging ATM-the user pays, not the site owner. In fact, the site owner, as is the case for many charging ATMs, receives a commission or rebate for transactions conducted on the Mini ATM. This logic has facilitated the roll-out of Mini ATMs to 1300 site owners in about 3 years.
The design of the Mini ATM cyborg is interesting in that it explicitly inscribes a third party, the site owner, into the ATM cyborg. Thus, the cyborg is now an ATM/user/siteowner cyborg. What was previously an explicitly two-way relationship (any third-party receipt of rebates being transparent to the user), is now an explicitly three-way relationship. This is a logic that is deliberately pursued by the bank, not least because it moves the not inconsiderable (given the prevalence of crime) responsibility and cost for the safe handling of cash to the site owner. The site owner is willing to take on this responsibility since it in fact reduces the cash-handling fees for the stores, by keeping the circulation of physical money inside the store. Not only does the cash dispensed to the Mini ATM user not have to be deposited with the bank at closing time, but in many cases, the cash is spent in the store. In addition, the Mini ATM in many cases increases footfall through the store, and thus turnover. Furthermore, as mentioned, the site owner receives a sliding-scale rebate on Mini ATM transactions conducted in his or her store. The case of a small retail store in the rural Eastern Cape is described thus by FNB:
One such community is in the Eastern Cape about 60 km from Butterworth. The local general dealer store was one of the early adopters of the Mini ATM device and has been successfully supplying the community with cash for several years now. . . .
. . . The owner of this store has reported a significant saving in cash deposit fees since the introduction of the Mini ATM.
The store now enjoys added peace of mind from the lower cash holding and is spending 80% less in cash deposit feesa significant saving for a small business like this. This is an added benefit to the rebate that FNB pays shop owners who install this device. . . .
On a recent visit to this store, the owner was happy to report that more people are purchasing in the store now. "Most people in this rural community live on social grants [R170 per child] and state pensions [R700], many of them supporting six or seven others on this small monthly income. Because of this, we're very busy at certain times of the month, and generally find that these pensioners will stay in the store and do their monthly shopping for food and supplies," the shopkeeper explains. (FNB, 2005c) However, it is the further unintended means of usage that make the translation from dispensing to cashless ATM an even more intriguing cyborg. In many cases, the problem of access is not just a physical one (is there an ATM at all?) but an economic or literacy one too. Thus, users of the Mini ATM will not only enroll the site owner into dispensing cash in exchange for a voucher, but they may also enroll the site owner in the entire transaction by handing over card and PIN number together with a verbal request for cash-an "assisted transaction." This is a reality not readily acknowledged by the bank for obvious legal reasons, but one that occurs nonetheless (and in fairness, not only at Mini ATMS). In at least one store observed, the Mini ATM was in fact not physically accessible to customers, but turned away to face the cashier in the store. 8 This reconfiguration of the cyborg extends to the siteowner responsibility for securing not only cash, but also the PIN number (which we recall, should never be divulged "not even to your spouse"). In some respects this points to a fairly serious imbalance in the power relations between the site owner, who can facilitate access, and the illiterate, or perhaps even simply unsure or naive, user. But of course, the relations are not unidirectional, and in small communities such as those in which the Mini ATM is typically deployed, the site owner and his or her customers are well known to each other, and the site owner (who is the store owner) relies on these very users for custom. Thus the extended cyborg is configured not just in the multiplicity of relations that is the banking network, but in the network of community relations too. This is not to minimize the power accorded to the site owner by the configuration of the Mini ATM. Such is the degree of power conferred that the international banking associations do not allow the VISA and Mastercard cards, which function on all other devices in the national network, to function on Mini ATMs. It would be entirely feasible for a shop owner to demand a further commission from the client for access to the cash, whether through compulsory in-store spending, or simply through a deduction in the amount dispensed-although the author did not observe such activity in any case. More benignly, as an example of the power of the site owner, a General Dealer in Soweto has, by way of a simple notice to this effect, limited the amount that he is willing to dispense via the ATM. The notice reads, "cash drawings allowed from R10-R500 only." 9 It is, of course, highly unusual for large amounts to be requested. On average, the transactions on the Mini ATM vary from R20 to R40.
In all cases, the customer pays standard ATM fees, which are different depending on the bank. FNB has fixed the price of Mini ATM fees at R1.50, and is attempting to persuade the other banks in the national network to provide fixed-fee pricing (not ad valorem) on Mini ATM transactions, but this has not yet been achieved. The cost of the transaction is not indicated during the transaction, or even on the slip, as this is seen as a security risk, as it is in all POS transactions. The user needs to request a statement-which may incur a transaction fee-in order to see transaction fees. Thus the Mini ATM provides access, but on terms dictated by the bank, and by the site owner, and at a cost. A non-FNB user on the Mini ATM could quite feasibly pay R5 per transaction or more, depending on the terms and conditions of his or her account. What is more, these terms and conditions are complex and may be difficult for a person who is not even sufficiently functionally literate to use the ATM to understand. 10 It would, in these circumstances, be tempting to judge the Mini ATM, along with other ATM networks in the South African context, as simply being exploitative, in the way in which it brings together bank, site owner, and user in a very unequal set of relations. However, this would be oversimplifying the situation. The reality is that we must also judge the cyborg of the Mini ATM, the cashless ATM, against the alternatives. The fact sheet issued by FNB, shown in Figure 3 , demonstrates that the monthly savings obtained by users of the min-ATM in a remote area of the country equate to approximately two weeks of groceries purchases.
We cannot discount these benefits. To have ready access to the banking network implies not only that rural people can access cash, but that they can use the network more effectively. For many individuals, for whom saving might otherwise be difficult, or limited to informal means, the Mini ATM has the potential to change banking behavior significantly. Although the Mini-ATM does not allow deposits, it does allow users to withdraw money deposited via other means-from social services, for example -in smaller amounts, thereby saving some portion. It also has the potential to allow for effective money transfer in communities where relatives are often migrant workers.
Thus we see that the Mini ATM too is the outcome of a complex political process, both overt-in the form of the Financial Services Charter-and covert-as in the idiosyncratic control of the ATM by site owners. The interests of the bank, site owner, and user are translated in the Mini ATM cybernetic network as indicated in Table 4 .
THE ATM POLITICAL SITE: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In our four narratives we have tried to show how different interests are negotiated and inscribed into the ATM cybernetic network-to reveal it as a political site rather than a mere "piece of technology." It is a site (re)configured through nonhuman artefacts such as speech files, plugs, headphones, no-go boxes, detection devices, messages, stickers, and so forth. It is also a site (re)configured through human behavioral prescriptions such as remembering your headphones, being suspicious, "using the knuckle of your middle finger," being cautious, reading messages, and so forth. In this political site, "different people [actors] are situated differently and possess unequal degrees of power as well as unequal levels of awareness" (Winner, 1999, p. 32) Some interests have become inscribed and some not. The talking ATM includes the interests of blind people but not the interest of other "disabled" people. They remain on the "outside" of the cybernetic network of convenient access to cash. Of course, some actors ought to remain outside. The anti-skimming device excludes the interests of criminals, and most people would agree that this is a good thing.
In these narratives we have also seen how many translations lead to unintended consequences, which become new possibilities for (re)negotiation and inscription. For example, from the bank's point of view we could see the successive translations of the ATM cyborg as follows:
r Possibility to give customers access to cash outside of banking hours (cash dispenser).
r Which becomes the possibility to reduce human tellers (less people in the banking hall).
r Which becomes the possibility to reduce cost of providing access to cash for the bank ("foreign" transactions in the LINK network).
r Which becomes the possibility to generate revenue for the bank (the market for cash access).
r And so forth.
Likewise, the way the users approach the ATM (manner, expectations, etc.) has also gone through a number of translations. At each of these translations, interests were renegotiated, implicitly or explicitly. With the development of fifth-generation web-enabled ATMs, the ATM is being conceived of as a "mall in the wall" . (Rawe et al., 2002) . The mall in the wall is not only the outcome of the development of technology, it is also and simultaneously the outcome of actors trying to get their interests inscribed into the ATM cybernetic network or political site.
The four narratives-or political programs, one might say-are presented here as different political "locations": access, security, cost. Obviously, these political programs occur simultaneously in, and through, the ATM site. In some instances they support each other and in some cases they contradict each other. For example, the usage of fingerprints for identification may not only inscribe the responsibility for security on the very body of the user, but it also has the potential to exclude those who have poor quality fingerprints, as have many individuals who have endured a lifetime of physical labour. 11 Advice to set lower daily limits or to draw smaller amounts of money may be a good prescription for security, but it would not make sense if the only access you have to an ATM is to a charging ATM.
Beyond these four narratives, there are other ways of conceiving an ATM. In the "personal ATM" the machine becomes "my ATM" as described by an ATM designer (McGill, 2003) :
My overriding philosophy on the future of the ATM industry in general and remote delivery of financial services is that success will come to those who more accurately emulate the human experience . . . that would involve things such as tailored greetings, ergonomic machines, more logical flow of screens, more functionality, and audio and visual links to customer service representatives and product specialists (online). Johnson and Coventry (2001) show how an ATMcalled Stella-can be designed as a "contactless ATM" that uses speech synthesis and recognition and therefore does not assume that the user can see, read, or manipulate a key board. One could also reconfigure the ATM cyborg by getting government to pass regulations about reasonable access (in terms of both location and charges). We must not forget that the "talking ATM" came about partly by the passage of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Similarly, the Financial Services Charter in South Africa, which has an explicitly sociopolitical imperative, drives the "cashless ATM" initiative. The bigger point here is that there are alternative ways of configuring the ATMs political site beyond the ones we presented here-that is, it could be otherwise. We need to scrutinize the current ATM configurations and also push for other more socially responsible ones.
Certainly, if technology is indeed society made durable (Latour, 1991) , then, for the most part, the current configuration of technology of the ATM does reflect the interests, inclusions, and exclusions that permeate the "market" for access to cash. The legitimacy of these interests should be, we believe, up for debate.
NOTES
1. We use the term constructivist as opposed to social constructivist in the way outlined by Brey (1997). Latour's constructivist position, which we accept here, does not give primacy to either the social (as social constructivists do) or the technical. These are treated as coconstitutive from the start.
2. The South African case itself, in fact, covers both aspects-of developed and developing markets-since the South African financial system is simultaneously both very sophisticated in its structure and use of technology, but also services (or does not yet adequately service) rural and developing markets within South Africa.
3. The card trap is often referred to as the "Lebanese loop." We are not sure where this obviously offensive reference comes from. It has been claimed that the technique first emerged in Lebanon.
4. http://www.absa.co.za; http://www.mandtbank.com/customer service/security messages.cfm; http://www.oldmutual.co.za/ombank/ CrimeAwareness/atmcrime.asp; http://www.persfin.co.za/index.php? fSectionId=581&fArticleId=2348885 5. Independent ATM deployers earn fees in two ways. They charge the bank the interchange fee, as well as charging the user directly. The direct charge to the customer is on average £1.50 but can be as high as £3.00.
6. One might agree with the IADs that it is a free market and that they are merely offering the users more choice. However, such "choice" is only a choice if the users are aware that they are in fact making a choice. This means that the user must be sufficiently informed about the nature of the ATM-and thus able to recognize the difference between a "charging ATM" and a "free ATM." Since April 2004, LINK has accepted self-regulation that requires its members to display notices on the machine-the IADs voted against this self-regulation, for obvious reasons. In evidence to the Select Committee on Treasury it was noted that:
Some operators appear to be flouting the spirit of the [LINK] agreement by displaying warnings in a way that makes them difficult to spot. For example, notices displayed in extremely small print, considerably smaller than any other print used in signage on the machine; warning stickers or signs that are of the same colour as the machines background; notices are "hidden" on the side of the machine or low down below eye level . . . 10. In a recent survey of bank charges, it took a team of accountants from Deloitte and Touche 40 hours to ascertain the monthly bank charges that would apply to a set of 8 transactions across 6 different banks (Finance Week, 2005) , and this team made errors in its final calculations (interview with M. Arnold, FNB, January 18, 2006). It is probably reasonable to state that even the average user has difficulty grasping the pricing structure of bank usage in South Africa.
11. As pointed out, in conversation, by Prof. David Dickinson, University of the Witwatersrand.
